The chief characteristics of deeply divided societies are contested, as there is no single definition of the term.[1] Frequently occurring characteristics include “class, caste, religion, language, race, ethnicity, and clan… settler versus native; immigrant versus indigenous population;” and other binaries.[2] The question of identity for both individuals and groups is almost always a defining factor. “Nationalism… combinations of religious and ethnic conflicts… and religious versus secular forces” usurp the previous identity and become the binding elements of the group.[3] These characteristics have developed from binaries as the result of the cultural memory of communities clashing. “All societies… [are] differentiated along class or communal lines or along both;” however, when individuals are driven by these divisions to politics, “conflict groups and organizations” arise.[4] The creation of political organizations formed along divisive lines is largely due to the influence of politicians and political aggressors who seek to inflame conflict for personal gain, or simply fail to manage conflict without entrenching the division between communities. Carment asserted that the state and the social realm are so intertwined “the state cannot claim that distributive problems are not political problems and must bear responsibility for these internal conflicts.”[5] Therefore, the principal characteristics of deeply divided societies are determined by the impact of political leaders and their influence produces great variability within divided communities.

 

The term “deeply divided,” originated in Eric Nordlinger’s book Conflict Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies and can be used more or less interchangeably with “plural,” “vertically segmented,” and “communally divided.”[6] These supplementary terms do not provide illumination towards a cohesive definition. Lustick claimed a divided society is a product of “boundaries between rival groups… [that are] sharp enough so that membership is clear, and with a few exceptions, unchangeable.”[7] He asserts that a characteristic of a divided society is that it contains un-malleable groups and conflict is deep rooted and existing for generations. Lederach defined deeply divided societies as “societies experiencing armed conflict at one of the three levels delineated by Wallenstein and Axell.”[8] These three levels are minor armed conflict, intermediate armed conflict, and war; connoting armed physical conflict, rather than solely sociological differences. [9] Du Toit wrote that four “variables” define a divided society including: the extent of the “opposing communities’” sense of culture, the “political releva[nce] of their culture, the “range of issues that are politicized along ethnic lines, and… the existence of other social cleavages that are also casual actors in political conflict.”[10] He was focused upon the social side of the division, contrasting Lederach’s assertion. Horowitz found “severely divided societies lie at one end of a spectrum. At the other end are fluid societies that have long contained groups whose descendants have blended into the general population.”[11] His explanation underscores the importance of politicians and government in the creation and understanding of a divided society in addition to the tendency of divided societies to have varied populations. Adrian Guelke denoted the term as “where ‘conflict exists along a well-entrenched fault line that is recurrent and endemic and that contains the potential for violence between the segments.”[12] Guelke’s is the most concise definition and covers both Lederach’s and Lustick’s qualifications as well as the social and political spectrum.

 

“Nationalist ideology tries to fill… [the] void inside” individuals who have had their identity encroached upon by their communal identity.[13] Ignatieff claimed that “nationalism does not simply “express” a preexistent identity: it “constitutes” a new one.”[14] Nationalism is more than a community’s feeling that has been suppressed; it must be spawned by a community, cultivated by grievances, and politicized into rebellion. In his book, The Warrior’s Honor, he interviewed a Serb foot soldier who struggled to articulate the difference between a Serb and a Croat and the initial cause of the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. His rhetoric is torn between declaring that “Croats and Serbs have nothing in common,” the source of the conflict is a class struggle between the two ethnic groups, and the admittance that Serbs and Croats “actually all the same” despite the differences between their communities.[15] There are “civilizational antagonisms” expressed within his claims, but one would expect someone fighting within a conflict to be capable discerning the difference between “myth and experience, fantasy and reality” and seek out its true source.[16] Stories and folklore have imbedded themselves into his, and the common, perception of the conflict and clouded his judgment of his neighbors. These distortions come originate with the political leaders within Former Yugoslavia in their attempt to create a cohesive military on all sides.

 

The soldier perceived his identity as “a relational term,” indicating multiple times that the identities of Serb and Croat are little more than mutually exclusive, “but when difference is relational, it is also an empty tautology.”[17] He, and many others in both communities, could not pinpoint whom he identifies as only what he could not. The soldier is not fighting for his own values, rather against the values of the ‘other,’ or ‘the enemy-other,’ as the Croats came to be understood in relation to his community. Other than this empty, relational difference, “he is fighting for… his own survival,” which he perceives as being threatened solely by ‘the enemy-other.’[18] His existence was secure prior to the conflict, which was not created of his own volition, despite his suffering of the consequences. Like many of his fellow fighters, “he now lives in a community of fear, [but its cause] is ultimately… mysterious to him.”[19] He understands that helped create fear within and between communities, but he cannot remember exactly what or who incited him to do so. As Guelke quoted Nordlinger, “a conflict is intense (or a society deeply divided) when a large number of conflict group members… manifest strongly held antagonistic beliefs and emotions towards the opposing segments.”[20] The differences between communities constituted more of their identities than their similarities. The community the soldier is fighting to remain a part of is solely defined by the fact that he is fighting against its other half. The exclusion of all parts of the identity of another group and all members of that group both prolongs the conflict and prevents the divide from integrating post-conflict. Thus, for “Freud… nationalism is a kind of narcissism… a nationalist… takes ‘minor differences’ -different in themselves- and transforms them into major differences” that create a divide.[21] Politicians magnify minor differences to use as tools of division with the objective of provoking conflict and validating the separation of societies. These differences are transformed into of individual and communal identity in many forms; one of these is ethnicity, which often factors into nationality as it provides a clear, immobile, historically evidenced line of division.

 

Nationalism is the most broad and frequent characteristic of a deeply divided society as it harbors “a strong intellectual… [and] emotive appeal.[22] It is also an “instrument” of political leaders used for “political mobilization and territorial organization.”[23] Nationalism is an expansive characteristic that is composed of many divisive elements including ethnicity and language. Ethno-nationalism, in which “the ethnic community should form the basis for the governance of independent states,” is one distinct illustration of nationalism taking hold within lines drawn by ethnicity.[24] Nationalism constitutes a divide between the nations that gain or lose power in government, but it does not determine where the division is drawn. Ethno-nationalism directly opposes nationalism within artificially drawn state lines. Despite the inclination to divide a state into homogenous communities, as seen in many stable European states, it has clearly failed in cases such as the Former Yugoslavia where geographic divisions are not preexisting between divided communities. Ethno-nationalism “originated separately in many parts of the globe… and continues to have… presence in (parts of) Germany… in Africa, in the Middle East, in South and Southeast Asia, and in Latin America.”[25] Thus, one must reject the assumption that “nationalist war is an eruption of tribal hatreds and ancient enmities” as it stems from political power imbalance between communities within what are perceived as superficially drawn boundaries.[26]

“Ethnic cleavages are especially prone to lead to political conflict… in the form of ethno-nationalism” as they typically include two clearly defined binary groups and a politically advantaged majority opposing disadvantaged minority group.[27] It is salient to note that binaries can be formed, in the case of the Former Yugoslavia, by the binding together of two ethnicities against another.[28] Politicians encourage clashes between ethnicities to gain power. This is a key way some political parties garner support against their opposition for either individual political gain, or for the benefit of their standing in parliaments. Further, by intertwining an issue with the goals of a specific community, a politician or a political group is guaranteed greater longevity and loyalty. Their rhetoric encourages political opinions to lean towards the more extreme ends of the political spectrum, where violence is found.[29] The existence of two or more ethnicities that are made up of a distinct, unchanging set of individuals is not the cause for concern. Rather, it is the stagnant nature of these groups “preclude[s] constructive engagement and [cannot] overcome the politics of the zero-sum-game.”[30] In “post-conflict agreements,” especially in states such as “Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia,” ethnicity has been institutionalized.[31] It is a part of “state institutions, including legislature, executive, judiciary and public administration,” entrenching ethnic divisions and reinforcing minority fears.[32] It has also been institutionalized in states such as Lebanon in the process of conflict resolution. The National Pact “locked the political system into a time warp” by using decade old census figures to determine government structure in 1943.[33] The Muslim population was growing and, despite having no census to prove their population, felt they were entitled to more political leadership. As the standing government was not accommodating, the Bosnian Muslims felt they could only generate change through violence, which led to war in May 1958.[34] The case study of the Former Yugoslavia is proof that the institutionalization of ethnicity inhibits the success of peace agreements, as the causes of the initial conflict remain in place, perhaps further ingrained than before the conflict.

 

Language is perceived as an element of ethnic conflict.[35] “Linguistic ethnonationalism” expresses the idea that a group can be united through language alone. This is only viable if the community as a whole bears a cultural and historical connection to “their oral and literary productions- poetry, myths, folklore, epics, and philosophical, religious/ historical/ scientific texts.”[36] For example, nearly seventy-five percent of the population of Yugoslavia spoke Serbo-Croatian, a language with two main dialects and two alphabets.[37] The “use of the Cyrillic alphabet… [was] limited to Serbia and Montenegro,” but the shift in dialects by an institutionalization of language separated Zagreb and Belgrade publications.[38] Political debates and perspectives, formerly provided by publications as a medium for integrated discussion on a widely available platform, were separated as well. The linguistic divide was based on principle as many well-regarded writers historically chose one dialect or the other, depending on their ethnicity, integrating dialect into their cultural heritage. The respective nation attempted to preserve what was perceived as their individual dialect for the layman and demand the state utilize it as well, causing controversy and division of language on the state level.[39] Additionally in Yugoslavia the ability to communicate across ethnic lines was hindered as “telephone lines from Serbia to Croatia and Bosnia were cut… [and] radicals took over local radio and TV stations.”[40] The moderate portion of the population was unable to relate and converse with moderates from another ethnicity to disperse political tension and quash the myths and rumors that drove their fear. The suppression of conversation drove the frightened moderates to political extremes as it was assumed that other moderates did not exist on the other side of the conflict as they could participate in the discourse of fear. Another exacerbating factor is that the “refugees were also placing themselves under the protection of armed radicals,” who could communicate their position with greater clarity than the moderates of the same group, leading radicalization to be somewhat synonymous with protection.[41] Language provides a basis for the division of communication the Former Yugoslavia and is an integral element of nationalism and ethnicity.

 

A difference of faith is another characteristic of a deeply divided society. The conflict can occur between different faiths or “branches of the same faith… The most obvious case of a society divided along sectarian lines is Northern Ireland.”[42] Societies divided by faith could also include the Former Yugoslavia where the division occurred between Bosnian Muslims, Croat Catholics, and Orthodox Serbs. While intermarriage was more typical between Croats and Serbs in Sarajevo and in cities generally, it was not typical between the Bosnian Muslims and the Catholic Croats, despite living in the same village.[43] While the two religions “shared the experience of rural life, the educational system, and the state bureaucracy,” the intermarriage rate was nearly non-existent.[44] Thus, they did not share many of the same traditions that were passed down through familial lines. Despite living in close quarters, the houses of Muslims and Croats were “easily distinguishable… by a marked difference in architecture.”[45] The houses belonging to the Bosnian Muslims resembled the mosque in the center of the village, as they were square. These houses tended to be surrounding the village mosque; they were also “built in clusters… [and] were usually inhabited by brothers and their nuclear families.”[46] The Catholic, belonging to the Croats, houses “were rectangular, with the longest side facing out toward the village.”[47] While the houses had similar entry points, the architectural divide was echoed in many rural villages “throughout rural Bosnia.”[48] The division in architecture served to illustrate the cultural divide between Serbs and Croats in the Former Yugoslavia.

 

Frank Wright introduced the notion of “representative violence,” which he denoted by asserting:

If anyone of a great number of people can be ‘punished’ for something done by the community they come from, and if the communities are sufficiently clearly defined, there is a risk that anyone attacking a member of the other community can set in motion an endless chain of violence.[49]

The most evident example of representative violence is the Northern Irish conflict, wherein the violence began on a much smaller scale, and grew to a larger scale with the aid of the media and perceived grievances towards entire communities. The history of violence in a deeply divided society creates mistrust within communities. It is probable for multiple versions of the truth, as understood by different communities, to exist in conflict-ridden societies. To move past violent conflict, both communities must recognize the difference in their cultural histories and accept the perspective of another community. The pain of the loss of loved ones and community grievances does not dull for generations and provides an incentive for the renewal of conflict.[50] Representative violence was evident in Yugoslavia where Croats and Muslims were friends and neighbors, but became divided due to the perception that one would find fault in the other.[51] As Wright stated, “it is only necessary for people to understand what is happening for it to create a generalized danger.”[52] This explains the near immediate polarization of societies upon the first onset of violent conflict. For the women interviewed in the documentary, We Are All Neighbours, the concern that their previous friend would misconstrue their actions as deceitful or dangerous was enough to keep them and their families apart.[53] The anticipation of emotional and physical harm is enough to rend villages and the act of Representative Violence is equally, if not more, powerful.

 

Social hierarchy is a factor that often falls within a deeply divided society as the “levels of individual and group insecurity” determine the level of violence.[54] “Fault lines [of a divided society can be]… of a politico-economic nature (i.e., class-based or ideological)” in particular conflicts, especially in that of Yugoslavia, where minority groups felt they were forced into a lower social class.[55] Class based conflicts also include caste conflicts, which are more directly controlled by religion, as “caste is commonly associated… with the practices of the Hindu religion.”[56] The connotation of caste is that it is immobile on the individual and community level as it is “predetermined;” whereas, class is fluctuating on both an individual and a community level.[57] Caste is perceived as a fixed state of life for those who are oppressed or ‘untouchable’ in society and this is perceived as a product of religious beliefs. However, religion is not a necessary instrument in a class driven conflict.

 

In Yugoslavia, Serb and Croat soldiers believed they were fighting for their social class with the objective of retaining and garnering both respect and political power. A Serb soldier claimed that the Croats thought ‘they’re “better than us,” which incensed him on a personal level and allowed him to believe political propaganda and scaremongering.[58] Hierarchical insecurity fuelled violent conflict in Former Yugoslavia on an individual level as individuals associated class with communal survival. Class is a likely driver of conflict as “human begins are hardwired to protect themselves from threats, both physical and psychological.”[59] “Dignity and self-worth” are included among a number of psychological threats that do not necessarily end with the conflict and are defended in a post conflict society.[60] After a conflict, individuals must “acknowledge that every interaction presents a choice: Will I honor or violate this person’s dignity?”[61] Class conflicts do not end with the violence, relations between the divided communities must be repaired and the communities prepared to integrate once more. Without integration, no assurances can be made to prevent conflict in the near future as continually polarized relations to not facilitate communication, respect, and understanding.

 

Conflicts in deeply divided societies can also be sparked by “ambitious or predatory political élites” seeking power by “mobiliz[ing] their constituents for aggressive purposes.”[62] The fracturing of Yugoslavia exemplifies political leaders using their populous for influence. “Serb and Croat peoples” were part of the same integrated communities interacting peacefully “until mobilized along ethnic lines by leaders who played on their latent grievances and fears of the future.”[63] The leaders, usually politicians attempting to gain power, created these fears by making untrue claims and scaling up trivial events and “minor differences.”[64] False histories, myths, and outright fallacies factored into the artificially escalated fear of individuals and communities fighting for survival. The anxieties of polarized groups ranged widely, from the concern over losing a community’s place in a long established social hierarchy to the loss of individual respect to the fight for survival in the face of the ‘enemy-other;’ these fears were nearly impossible to counteract due to their breadth. “The result [of these fears] is a deeply divided society whose members may withdraw temporarily into their communal containers for life support” in their fight to survive and need for validation of their identity.[65] A community provided safety in numbers for many individuals. Without their respective communities many would have lost their sense of identity, along with their families, and their method of staying informed about the violence around them.[66] Communities provided a sense of security and identity for individuals that were essentially victims of political games.

 

Divided societies tend to be composed of binaries such as “settler versus native… pastoralist versus cultivator; peasant versus land owner; urban versus rural; and center versus periphery.”[67] One binary in a divided society can present between the “settlers and [the] natives.”[68] Guelke attributes this binary to “a legacy of colonization or conquest in many parts of the world.”[69] The divide is customarily established by ethnicity or race, which provide categorically unchangeable groups many of which are already oppressed due to the nature of colonialism.[70] The divide “between indigenous [people] and immigrants and… settler[s] and natives” is exacerbated by the lending of “greater political legitimacy… to groups that can make a convincing claim for their historical precedence.”[71] The precedence leads the native group to feel ownership of the land and a cultural connection to it. Therefore, their defense of their land is seen as a cultural imperative to protect their history, rather than an ethnic dispute. Other binaries form in much the same way whether they are established by ethnicity, race, or position in the social hierarchy.

 

A majority versus minority conflict in a deeply divided society may prompt the minority group to migrate due to pressure and “discrimination” from the government and the populous of the majority group.[72] This emigration would be advantageous to the majority group especially in the case of the Former Yugoslavia, where Bosnian Serbs hoped to unite with Serbian Serbs by forcing Bosnian Muslims from their traditional villages.[73] This task was undertaken by targeting the Bosnian Muslim’s religion and inciting police violence. The rhetoric included aligning the Bosnian Muslims with Serbs, forcing a three party conflict into a binary conflict. Rhetoric claiming, “the Muslims of Bosnia are in fact Islamicized Serbs, and part of the population of so-called Croats consists of in fact Catholic Serbs.”[74] Forced migration also occurred, in parts of western Slavonia, the Baranja and Krajina Croats so terrorized Serbs into flight.”[75] Other “atrocities,” such as “cultural cleansing,” mass murder, and rape, were used to “terrorize entire ethnic communities to flee.”[76] The Security Dilemma between ethnicities in Yugoslavia would not have occurred if Milosevic had not gained leadership in a democracy that allowed ethnic polarization by districts.[77] As Eric Nordlinger claimed, “successful or unsuccessful regulation [of deeply divided societies] will be largely dependent on the purposeful behavior of political elites.”[78]

 

Differences in quality of life as perceived by the two groups can also lead to conflict. These differences can be attributed to cultural implications as well as political fault. “This is especially prominent in native or immigrant minorities,” where the minority group’s culture is noticeably different from the majority group’s culture.[79] Mann discussed the prevalence of “cultural cleansing” in Yugoslavia by noting that “mosques, libraries, and other Muslim monuments were systematically razed to the ground in Serb-occupied areas, while a few Catholic and Orthodox churches were also destroyed.”[80] The destruction of an individual’s or a group’s culture and the disruption of their religious practices nearly forces them to emigrate from the disputed area. Further, the desire of a group, like the Serbs, to halt the “exodus” of their people provides a reason for a community to resort to violence.[81] This occurred in the Former Yugoslavia as the Serbs took up arms to protect their communities from the Albanians who were fighting for an “ethically pure Kosovo.”[82] The disparity between the customs of the two groups emphasizes the nature of ‘the other’ and inflates the divide by discouraging integration and communal cooperation.

 

Poor political leadership, the formation of a communal identity, and the result of violence ending with group migration characterize deeply divided societies. Group identities are formed through nationalism, ethnicity, language, faith, class, and binaries. These identities are used to divide a society into a recognized identity and ‘the other.’ Political leaders producing and manipulating the anxieties of a group for political gain create this divide through power plays and rhetoric of fear. When the aims of the political party and the need to protect a group’s identity for individual survival become aligned, violence ensues. Political leaders incite this violence without repercussions as “the restless discontent of many… groups with the conditions of their existence has led to the articulation of powerful demands for change” in many divided societies.[83] Political leaders use the population’s “discontent to question the “legitimacy of [political] outcomes” in a divided society to manipulate the blurred boundaries between the political and social spheres.[84] By challenging governmental decisions, political leaders justify the protestors and others inciting communal violence. These political challenges further prompt intergroup violence and fracture once harmonious communities into the “communities of fear” characterized in a divided society. [85]

 

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Binningsbø, H.M. (2012) Journal of Peace Research 49 (6). Sage Publications, Ltd.: 876–76.

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[1] Du Toit, P. (1989) “Bargaining About Bargaining: Inducing the Self-negating Prediction in Deeply Divided Societies–the Case of South Africa”. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (2). Sage Publications, Inc.: 210–30. p.210

[2] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies. Polity Press: Cambridge, p.14

[3] Dryzek, J.S. (2005) “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia.” Political Theory. 33 (2). Sage Publications, Inc.: 218–42, p.219

[4] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies, p.30

[5] Carment, D. 2005. Journal of Peace Research. 42 (3). Sage Publications, Ltd.: 359–60, pp.359-60

[6] Lustick, I. (1979) “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control.” World Politics 31 (3). Cambridge University Press: 325–44, p.325

[7] Dryzek, J.S. (2005) “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia.” Political Theory. 33 (2). Sage Publications, Inc.: 218–42, p.325

[8] Lederach, J.P. (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided Societies. United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington, D.C, p.11

[9] Ibid, p.4

[10] Du Toit, P. (1989) “Bargaining About Bargaining: Inducing the Self-negating Prediction in Deeply Divided Societies–the Case of South Africa.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 33 (2). Sage Publications, Inc.: 210–30, p.210

[11] Horowitz, D.L. (1993) “Democracy in Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy. 4 (4). Johns Hopkins University Press: 18-38, p.20

[12] Binningsbø, H.M. (2012) Journal of Peace Research 49 (6). Sage Publications, Ltd.: 876–76, p.876

[13] Ignatieff, M. (1998) The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and The Modern Conscience. Chatto and Windus: London, pp.37-8

[14] Ibid, p.38

[15] Ibid, p.36

  • [16] Ibid, pp.36-7

[17] Ignatieff, M. (1998) The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and The Modern Conscience. Chatto and Windus: London, p.37

[18] Ibid, p.37

[19] Ibid, p.37

[20] Guelke, Adrian. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies. Polity Press: Cambridge, p.30

[21] Ignatieff, M. (1998) The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and The Modern Conscience. Chatto and Windus: London, p.51

[22] Chisholm, M. and Smith, D.M. (1990) Shared Space: Divided Space Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization. Unwin Hyman Ltd: London, p.6

[23] Ibid, p.6

[24] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies, p.32

  • [25] Wilmsen, E. N. and McAllister, P. (1996) The Politics of Difference. The University of Chicago Press, Ltd: London,124

[26] Ignatieff, M. (1998) The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War And The Modern Conscience. Chatto and Windus: London, p.35

[27] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies, p.20

[28] Ibid, p.22

[29] Du Toit, P. (1989) “Bargaining About Bargaining: Inducing the Self-negating Prediction in Deeply Divided Societies–the Case of South Africa.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 33 (2). Sage Publications, Inc.: 210–30, p.211

[30] Bieber, F. (2003) The Challenge of Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans: Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies. European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online. 3(1). 1-34, p.2

[31] Ibid, p.2

[32] Ibid, p.2

  • [33] Hiro, D. (1992) Lebanon: Fire and Embers: a history of the Lebanese civil war. St Martin’s Press: New York, p. 200

[34] Hiro, D. (1992) Lebanon: Fire and Embers: a history of the Lebanese civil war. St Martin’s Press: New York, p. 200

[35] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies, p.18

  • [36] Wilmsen, E. N. and McAllister, P. (1996) The Politics of Difference. The University of Chicago Press, Ltd: London, pp.131-2

[37] Magner, T.F. (1967) Language and Nationalism in Yugoslavia. Canadian Slavic Studies. 1(3). 333-47, p.335

[38] Ibid, p.335

[39] Magner, T.F. (1967) Language and Nationalism in Yugoslavia. Canadian Slavic Studies. 1(3). 333-47, p.335

  • [40] Mann, M. (2005) The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.383

[41] Mann, M. (2005) The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.383

[42] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies, p.18

[43] Bringa, T. (1995) Being Muslim The Bosnian Way: Identity And Community In A Central Bosnian Village, p.39

[44] Bringa, T. (1995) Being Muslim The Bosnian Way: Identity And Community In A Central Bosnian Village, p.39

[45] Ibid, p.39

[46] Ibid, p.40

[47] Ibid, p.40

[48] Ibid, p.39

[49] Wright, F. (1988) Northern Ireland: a comparative analysis. Barns & Noble: Dublin, p.11

  • [50] Hicks, D. and Phillips, T. (2009) “The Psychology of the Past”. Fortnight, no. 466. Fortnight Publications Ltd.: 13–13, p.13
  • [51] We Are All Neighbours. (1993) Directed By: Debbie Christie. Online. London, England: Royal Anthropological Institute.

[52] Wright, F. (1988) Northern Ireland: a comparative analysis. Barns & Noble: Dublin, p.11

[53] We Are All Neighbours. (1993) Directed By: Debbie Christie. Online. London, England: Royal Anthropological Institute.

[54] Rothchild, D. and Hartzell, C.A. (1999) “Security In Deeply Divided Societies: The Role Of Territorial Autonomy.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 5(3-4) 254-271 p.255

[55] Ibid, p.255

[56] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies, p.15

[57] Ibid, p.15

[58] Ignatieff, M. (1998) The warrior’s honor: ethnic war and the modern conscience. Chatto and Windus: London, p.36

[59] Hicks, D, and Phillips, T. (2009) “The Psychology of the Past”. Fortnight, no. 466. Fortnight Publications Ltd.: 13–13, p.13

[60] Ibid, p.13

[61] Ibid, p.13

[62] Rothchild, D. and Hartzell, C.A. (1999) Security in deeply divided societies: The role of territorial autonomy, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, pp.255-6

[63] Ibid, pp.255-6

[64] Ignatieff, M. (1998) The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and The Modern Conscience. Chatto and Windus: London, p.51

[65] Ibid, p.256

[66] We Are All Neighbours. (1993) Directed By Debbie Christie. Online. London, England: Royal Anthropological Institute.

[67] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies, p.22

[68] Ibid, p.22

[69] Ibid, p.22

[70] Ibid, p.22

[71] Ibid, p.24

  • [72] Hughes, J. (2005) ‘Exit’ in Deeply Divided Societies: regimes of Discrimination in Estonia and Latvia and the Potential for Russophone Migration. Journal of Common Market Studies. 43 (4). 739-62, p.739

[73] Malcolm, N. (2002) Bosnia; A Short History. Pan: London, pp.226-7

  • [74] Malcolm, N. (2002) Bosnia; A Short History. Pan: London, pp.226-7
  • [75] Mann, M. (2005) The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.357

[76] Ibid, p.356-7

[77] Ibid, p.376

  • [78] Nordlinger, E. (1972) Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, p.4

[79] Hasisi, B. (2008) “Police, Politics, and Culture in a Deeply Divided Society.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-) 98 (3). Northwestern University School of Law: 1119–45, p.1119

  • [80] Mann, M. (2005) The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p.357

[81] The Death of Yugoslavia. (1995) Produced By: Norma Percy. Online. United Kingdom: BBC.

[82] Ibid

  • [83] Lustick, I. (1979) “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control”, p.325

[84] Guelke, A. (2012) Politics in Deeply Divided Societies, p.32

[85] Ignatieff, M. (1998) The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War And The Modern Conscience, p.37

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